Searle on Consciousness
He starts ( 4:03 ) talking about the difference between epistemically objective and subjective claims . I was thinking about human experience and the idea that we share certain common experience on account of our being human beings in common situations. This is ultimately what we mean when we make claims about the existence of qualia, which Searle calls ontologically subjective claims (the immediate subjective experience of seeing a colour, for example). We say the qualia "exist" because we have plenty of epistemic justification for believing there is some common shared experience to seeing colours. We usually get this justification through sharing linguistic representations of the experience. The so-called "hard problem of consciousness" is to try to explain the ontological foundation of these qualia ( 38:48 ). Some people think that an explanation of this needs to be given in terms of physics. I wrote in 2010 that this is not so, because physics as an empirical ...