Graham Priest on Revising Logic

Talk given in July 2012 at University of Munich conference Paradox and Logical Revision, 23–25 July 2012. There is a write-up of the programme in The Reasoner Vol. 6 No. 9.

See Priest's SEP article on Paraconsistent Logic. 

My comment:

28:33 on rationally revising logica utens leading to a rational revision of logica docens. There is a very striking comment in Per Martin-Löf's “On the Meanings of the Logical Constants and the Justifications of the Logical Laws” around p23: on the idea "that a declarative sentence is an expression which denotes a truth value, or is the name of a truth value." he writes "The trouble arises when you come to the laws for forming quantified propositions, the quantifiers not being restricted to finite domains.... To my mind, at least, they simply fail to be evident." Is that really a rational revision of logica utens? He elaborates, but the original motive remains a simple fact of his personal subjective experience, and he is explicit about this.

In 2009 I tried to get people to engage in a discussion about the notion of meaning and truth. I wrote down one and a half pages which gave what I thought was a minimal example of a syntactic characterisation of meaning which seemed to capture something about the idea of meaning being tied to context. But I am not a model-theorist or a proof-theorist so I couldn't really take it any further on my own. See On Tarski's Semantic Definition of Truth "Convention T". 

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